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AN OVERVIEW OF INDONESIA’S 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW 
HIKMAHANTO JUWANA* 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
March 5, 1999, is an important date in the history of competition law 
and policy in Indonesia. It was on this day that Indonesia enacted Law 
Number 5 of 1999 Concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices 
and Unfair Business Competition (Law No. 5).1 With its enactment, 
Indonesia joined the many countries around the world with antimonopoly 
laws.  
Law No. 5 contains specific and comprehensive rules governing 
competition between business actors. Prior to the promulgation of Law 
No. 5, legal provisions governing competition in Indonesia were scattered 
throughout numerous laws. For example, Article 382bis of the Indonesian 
Criminal Code contains provisions governing unfair competition,2 and the 
Basic Law of Industry No. 5 of 1984 contains regulations intended to 
promote competition.3 Additionally, businesses often cited Article 1365 of 
 * Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia; Member, Partnership for 
Business Competition; LL.B. 1987, University of Indonesia; LL.M. 1992, Keio University, Japan; 
Ph.D. 1997, University of Nottingham. This Article was presented at the APEC Competition Policy 
and Economic Development Conference, jointly organized by the Center for Global Partnership and 
the Institute of Comparative Law in Japan, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan, July 5-7, 2001. 
 1. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Namor 5 Tahun 1999 Tentang Larangen Praktek 
Monopoli Dan Persaingen Tidak Sehat [Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 5 of 1999, Concerning 
the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition], 33 LEMBARAN NAGARA 
[STATE GAZETTE] (1999) [hereinafter Law No. 5 of 1999]. A version in English is available at 
http://english.pbc.or.id/data/uu_monopoli_%28english%29.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2002) and a 
version in Bahasa Indonesia is available at http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Ithaca1955/unfair/ 
iuu599.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2002). 
 2. Article 382 bis of the Criminal Code states: 
Whomsoever engages in an act of deception to mislead the public or a certain individual with 
the purpose of establishing or prospering his/her merchandise or his/her own company or the 
property of another person, will be sentenced for unfair competition, with imprisonment for a 
maximum of one year and four months or a fine of Rp. 13,500 if such an act might give rise 
to his/her own competition or the competition of any other person. 
KITAB UNDANG-UNDANG HUKUM PIDANA SERTA KOMENTAR-KOMENTARNYA LENGKAP PASAL DEMI 
PASAL [CRIMINAL CODE WITH COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY] art. 382bis (1976) [hereinafter 
CRIMINAL CODE]. 
 3. Article 7 states that “[t]he Government shall regulate, guide and develop industries in order 
to: . . . (2) develop fair and healthy competition and prevent unhealthy competition . . .” Law of the 
Republic of Indonesia, No. 5 of 1984, Law Concerning Industrial Affairs, 22 LEMBARAN NAGARA 
[STATE GAZETTE] art. 7 (1984). 
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the Civil Code as a basis for recovering damages suffered as a result of 
unfair competition from competitors.4 
The desire to have a comprehensive antimonopoly law in Indonesia 
dates back to 1990. Many scholars, political parties, non-governmental 
organizations, and even certain government institutions discussed and 
proposed developing an antimonopoly law. In fact, the Indonesian 
Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI) went so far as to 
produce a draft antimonopoly law.5 Similarly, the Indonesian Department 
of Trade, in cooperation with the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Indonesia, produced a draft law entitled “Healthy Business Competition.”6 
Unfortunately, the political elite did not seriously consider these proposals 
because they believed the present political and economic environment was 
not conducive to such an initiative and, subsequently, that there was 
insufficient political commitment to pursuing the eradication of 
monopolistic practices. On the contrary, the government actively allowed 
and encouraged various industry monopolies to flourish. 
The proposal to introduce an antimonopoly law gained momentum 
when the government signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) on July 29, 1998.7 Under the terms of the LOI, the 
Indonesian government promised to submit a draft antimonopoly law to 
the Indonesian House of Representatives no later than December 1998. 
The government at this point became serious about introducing an 
antimonopoly law, which was due in part to the public demand for an end 
to monopolistic practices. In addition, the government viewed the law as a 
means of taming the public outcry to end corruption, collusion, and 
cronyism.  
One interesting aspect of Law No. 5 is that, in contrast to other 
Indonesian laws, Law No. 5 is the result of the Indonesian Parliament’s 
inaugural exercise of its right to initiate the drafting of the law, despite the 
fact that the Indonesian government already had prepared its own draft. 
However, when Indonesian government officials met with Parliament 
 4. Article 1365 of the Civil Code states: “Each act that is unlawful and causes loss to other 
parties shall obligate the person causing such loss by their fault to compensate for such loss.” INDON. 
CIVIL CODE art. 1365. 
 5. The Department of Research and Development of the Indonesian Democratic Party proposed 
the draft in 1995. 
 6. This cooperation took place from 1993 to 1994. 
 7. Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the Government of 
Indonesia to the International Monetary Fund (July 29, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/loi/072998.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2002). 
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members to discuss the draft law, they agreed to use the Parliament’s 
proposal as the working draft.8 
II. LAW NO. 5 
Law No. 5 is composed of eleven chapters and fifty-three articles. 
Although enacted on March 5, 1999, it became effective one year later, on 
March 5, 2000.9 The government gave businesses an additional six months 
after enactment (until September 2000) to review their past actions and 
ensure that future conduct complied with Law No. 5.10 
A. The Prohibition Principles in Law No. 5 
Law No. 5 prohibits business practices that unfairly restrict 
competition. The law prohibits practices based solely on market structure 
and market shares, although it contains some provisions that initially 
appear to prohibit certain market structures and shares. These provisions 
are found in Articles 4(2),11 13(2),12 and 17(2)(c),13 and they mention 
specific market share percentages. If read carefully, however, the market 
share percentages serve only as a triggering event for the presumption that 
business actors may be violating Law No. 5. If this presumption is 
rebutted successfully, the government then must prove that an actual 
violation occurred. 
The provisions in Law No. 5 that incorporate market share percentages 
likely reflect a compromise between the government and the Indonesian 
 8. This draft law was promulgated in accordance with Article 21(1) of the Indonesian 
Constitution before being amended. The Parliament=s Prolegnas team from the Economic and Finance 
Division (EKKU) and the Industry and Development Division (INBANG) prepared it in four months. 
It was named the “Draft Law on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices” without including the term 
“Unfair Competition.” 
 9. See Law No. 5 of 1999 art. 53 (Indon.) 
 10. See id. art. 52(2). 
 11. Article 4(2) states: “[A]ny entrepreneur can be suspected or considered as jointly controlling 
production and/or the marketing of good and/or services . . . if two or three entrepreneurs or groups of 
entrepreneurs own more than 75% (seventy-five percent) of the market share of one type of certain 
goods or services.” Id. art. 4(2) (emphasis added). 
 12. Article 13(2) states: “Entrepreneurs can be suspected or considered as jointly controlling the 
buying or receiving of supplies . . . if two or three entrepreneurs or groups of entrepreneurs control 
more than 75% (seventy-five percent) of the market share of one type of certain goods or services.” Id. 
art. 13(2) (emphasis added). 
 13. Article 17(2)(c) states: “Entrepreneurs can be suspected or considered as jointly controlling 
production and/or marketing . . . if one entrepreneur or one group of entrepreneurs controls more than 
50% (fifty percent) of the market share of one type of certain goods or services.” Id. art. 17(2)(c) 
(emphasis added). 
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Parliament. As is evident from an early draft of Law No. 5, the Parliament 
initially wanted to use market structure and market share as the basis for 
finding a violation: 
Every business actor shall be prohibited from conducting one or 
several businesses with its competitor, either individually or jointly, 
which . . . takes control of the production and/or distribution and/or 
marketing of goods and/or services in an amount that exceeds 30% 
of the national market share.14 
This provision clearly differs from Article 4(2) of Law No. 5, which 
states: 
Any entrepreneur can be suspected or considered as jointly 
controlling production and/or the marketing of goods and/or 
services . . . if two or three entrepreneurs or groups of entrepreneurs 
own more than 75% (seventy-five percent) of the market share of 
one type of certain goods or services.15 
Article 4(2) clearly does not prohibit business actors from exceeding 
certain market shares, nor does it provide that exceeding 75% of the 
market share alone is sufficient to constitute a violation. 
B. Per Se Illegality and the Rule of Reason in Law No. 5 
Similar to many jurisdictions, Law No. 5 uses both the concept of per 
se illegality and the rule of reason to determine possible violations. As a 
general rule, provisions requiring rule of reason analysis culminate with 
the words “may result in monopolistic practices and/or unfair 
competition.” Syamsul Maarif goes so far as to categorize price fixing, 
price discrimination, boycotts, tie-in sales, conspiracy to obstruct 
production, and the abuse of a market dominant position as per se illegal.16 
However, future decisions by both the Komisi Pengawas Persaingan 
Usaha (KPPU) (translated, the “Commission for the Supervision of 
Business Competition”), which is empowered to enforce Law No. 5, and 
the courts will show clearly which provisions will require the rule of 
 14. Indonesian Parliament, Draft Law on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices art. 20(a) 
(1999) (Indon.) (emphasis added) (on file with author). 
 15. Law No. 5 of 1999 art. 4(2) (Indon.). 
 16. See SYAMSUL MAARIF, ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW AND ENSURING ITS 
TRANSPARENCY IN INDONESIA 165 (Inst. of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 2001).  
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reason analysis to determine a violation and which provisions will require 
the more summary per se treatment. 
C. Prohibitions in Law No. 5 
Under Law No. 5 there are three categories of prohibitions: prohibited 
contracts, prohibited activities, and a prohibition against the abuse of a 
market dominant position. 
1. Prohibited Contracts 
Law No. 5 prohibits contracts that have the purpose or effect of 
oligopoly, price fixing, dividing territory, boycotting, cartelization, trust, 
oligopsony, vertical integration, or exclusive dealing, as well as contracts 
with foreign parties that may result in monopolistic practices or unfair 
business competition. 
Law No. 5 defines a “contract” as “an action by one or more 
entrepreneurs to bind themselves with one or more other entrepreneurs 
under any name, either made in writing or not.”17 This definition parallels 
the definition commonly found in contract law, but in contrast to 
competition law, it fails to emphasize the importance of concerted action. 
This failure is due primarily to a lack of understanding on the part of the 
drafters. 
First, Law No. 5 prohibits contracts that may create an oligopoly. 
Article 4(1) states that entrepreneurs may not contract with other 
entrepreneurs to gain joint control over the production and/or marketing of 
goods and services if the contract causes monopolistic practices and/or 
unfair business competition. “If two or three entrepreneurs or groups of 
entrepreneurs own more than 75% (seventy-five percent) of the market 
share of one type of certain goods or services,” then any one of the 
entrepreneurs is considered to have joint control.18 
Second, Law No. 5 prohibits contracts between entrepreneurs that have 
the effect of price fixing, or forming certain agreed upon prices. There are 
four prohibited types of price fixing. First, entrepreneurs are prohibited 
from directly fixing prices of their goods or services.19 Second, 
 17. Law No. 5 of 1999 art. 1(7) (Indon.). 
 18. Id. art. 4(2). 
 19. The prohibition against this type of price fixing is in Article 5, which states that 
“[e]ntrepreneurs are prohibited from making any contract with other business competitors in order to 
fix prices on certain goods and/or services to be borne by the consumers or clients in the same relevant 
market.” Id. art. 5(1). 
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entrepreneurs are prohibited from fixing prices that may result in price 
discrimination.20 Third, entrepreneurs are prohibited from fixing the prices 
of goods or services below a certain market price that may result in unfair 
competition.21 Finally, entrepreneurs are prohibited from fixing prices on 
resale at a higher price than the original purchase price.22 
Third, Law No. 5 prohibits contracts that seek to allocate the market 
between entrepreneurs. Article 9 provides that entrepreneurs legally may 
not agree to divide or allocate the market because such a division may 
result in monopolistic practices or unfair competition.23 
Fourth, Law No. 5 prohibits contracts that have the effect of boycotting 
other entrepreneurs so that they are unable to enter into the relevant 
market. Article 10(1) states that entrepreneurs are prohibited from 
contracting with their competitors to hamper other entrepreneurs from 
engaging in the same business, either in domestic or international 
markets.24 In addition, Article 10(2) prohibits entrepreneurs from 
contracting with their competitors to refuse to sell goods or services of 
other entrepreneurs that either will result in losses/damage to the other 
entrepreneurs or restrict the ability of other businesses to sell or buy goods 
or services in the relevant market.25 
Fifth, Law No. 5 prohibits contracts that form cartels. Article 11 
prohibits entrepreneurs from contracting with their competitors in order to 
influence prices by fixing production and/or marketing if the result is 
either unfair competition or monopolistic activity.26 
Sixth, Law No. 5 prohibits trust contracts where multiple enterprises 
combine under the guise of a holding company to jointly control the 
production or marketing of goods or services, if the end result is either 
monopolistic activity or unfair competition.27 
 20. The prohibition against this type of price fixing is in Article 6, which states that 
“[e]ntrepreneurs are prohibited from making contracts which cause buyers to pay a different price 
from the price that must be paid by other buyers for the same type of goods and/or services.” Id. art. 6. 
 21. The prohibition against this type of price fixing is in Article 7, which states that 
“[e]ntrepreneurs are prohibited from making any contract with other business competitors in order to 
fix the price below the market price, which can cause unfair business competition.” Id. art. 7. 
 22. The prohibition against this type of price fixing is in Article 8, which states that 
“[e]ntrepreneurs are prohibited from making any contract with other entrepreneurs which sets the 
condition that the receivers of the goods and/or services are not to resell or resupply the goods and/or 
services they receive, under a price lower than the price agreed upon, thus causing unfair business 
competition.” Id. art. 8. 
 23. Id. art. 9.  
 24. Id. art. 10(1).  
 25. Id. art. 10(2).  
 26. Id. art. 11.  
 27. Id. art. 12.  
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Seventh, Law No. 5 prohibits contracts that form oligopsonies. Article 
13 prohibits entrepreneurs from contracting with other entrepreneurs to 
jointly control the buying or receiving of supplies in order to control 
prices.28 In addition, there is a rebuttable presumption of a violation if two 
or more entrepreneurs control more than 75% of the market share of a 
given type of product or service.29 
Eighth, Law No. 5 prohibits contracts that control the production of 
products belonging to a direct or indirect vertically integrated production 
chain of goods or services if the end result causes “unfair competition 
and/or damages to the public.”30 
Ninth, Law No. 5 prohibits entrepreneurs from entering into three types 
of closed contracts. First and foremost, entrepreneurs may not contract to 
prevent the parties receiving the goods or services from either resupplying 
or not resupplying those goods or services to certain designated parties.31 
Second, entrepreneurs may not contract to require the receiving parties to 
purchase the goods or services from the supplying party under specific 
forced terms.32 Third, entrepreneurs may not form exclusive price 
contracts that contain stipulated terms that require the receiving parties to 
either purchase or not purchase from the supplying company the same or 
similar goods from competitors of the supplier.33 
Lastly, Indonesian entrepreneurs may not contract with international 
parties if the contract results in monopolistic practices or unfair 
competition.34 
2. Prohibited Activities 
Law No. 5 prohibits monopoly, monopsony, market dominance, and 
conspiracy. However, unlike prohibited contracts, prohibited activities can 
apply to a single entrepreneur. 
The first prohibited activity, under Article 17, is one that results in an 
entrepreneur having monopoly power through unfair competition.35 In 
addition, there is a rebuttable presumption of the existence of a monopoly 
if: (1) there are no reasonable substitutes for the goods or services; (2) 
 28. Id. art. 13(1).  
 29. Id. art. 13(2). 
 30. Id. art. 14.  
 31. Id. art. 15(1).  
 32. Id. art. 15(2).  
 33. Id. art. 15(3).  
 34. Id. art. 16.  
 35. Id. art. 17(1).  
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other entrepreneurs are unable to compete for the same type of goods or 
services; or (3) one entrepreneur, or group of entrepreneurs, controls more 
than 50% of the relevant market share.36 
The second prohibited activity is one that results in monopsony. Article 
18(1) prohibits entrepreneurs from controlling the receipt of supplies and 
existing as the sole buyer of goods or services within a relevant market if 
monopolistic practices or unfair competition will result.37 In addition, 
Article 18(2) contains a rebuttable presumption of the existence of 
monopsony if one entrepreneur, or one group of entrepreneurs, controls 
more than 50% of the relevant market share.38 
The third prohibited activity concerns the controlling of markets by 
entrepreneurs, which they can do in any one of three ways. First, as stated 
in Article 19, entrepreneurs may not conduct separate or joint business 
activities that result in monopolistic practices or unfair competition by: (1) 
preventing others from conducting the same or similar business; (2) 
preventing the competitor’s clients from contacting their competitors; (3) 
restricting sales or distribution in the relevant market; or (4) discriminating 
against specific businesses.39 Second, as stated in Article 20, entrepreneurs 
may not either reduce their profit margin to zero or undersell their 
competitors with the intention of forcing their competitors out of 
business.40 Third, according to Article 21, entrepreneurs may not cheat in 
allocating the costs of production and other related expenses for the 
relevant goods or services.41 
The final prohibited activity concerns conspiracy, of which there are 
three types. First, entrepreneurs may not conspire in bid rigging for tender 
offers.42 Second, entrepreneurs may not conspire to obtain their 
competitors’ trade secrets.43 Finally, Law No. 5 prohibits conspiracies to 
impair competitors’ production or marketing in order to “reduce the 
quantity, quality, and . . . punctuality of the goods and/or services . . . in 
the relevant market.”44 
 36. Id. art. 17(2).  
 37. Id. art. 18(1).  
 38. Id. art. 18(2).  
 39. Id. art. 19.  
 40. Id. art. 20.  
 41. Id. art. 21.  
 42. Id. art. 22.  
 43. Id. art. 23.  
 44. Id. art. 24.  
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3. Prohibition Against the Abuse of a Market Dominant Position 
The prohibition against the abuse of a market dominant position centers 
on interlocking directorates, share ownership, and mergers, acquisitions, 
and dissolutions. Law No. 5 holds that entrepreneurs occupy a market 
dominant position if any one entrepreneur, or one group of entrepreneurs, 
controls at least 50% of the relevant market share, or if two or three 
entrepreneurs, or groups of entrepreneurs, control at least 75%.45 
First, Law No. 5 generally prohibits entrepreneurs from taking direct or 
indirect advantage of their dominant position by imposing intentionally 
unfavorable trade terms to prevent consumer access to competitors’ 
products, restricting development, or preventing potential competitors 
from entering the market.46 
Second, Law No. 5 prohibits abuses stemming from an individual that 
serves as the director or commissioner of two companies if the companies 
are in the same market, produce similar goods or services, or could 
“jointly control the market share of certain goods and/or services.”47 
Third, entrepreneurs may not hold a majority of the outstanding shares 
of, or unilaterally establish, multiple firms that conduct the same or similar 
business activities in the same market if it causes them (or their group) to 
control at least 50% of the relevant market share. This prohibition also 
applies if the ownership creates the position where two or three 
entrepreneurs control at least 75% of the market share.48 
Finally, Article 28 prohibits entrepreneurs from merging or dissolving 
companies, or acquiring shares of companies, if doing so would result in 
monopolistic practices or unfair competition.49 Article 28(3), recognizing 
the vagueness of Article 28(1) and (2), indicates that clarifying provisions 
to provide additional guidance may be found in unstipulated government 
regulations. To date, however, the government has not implemented these 
regulations.50 
4. Exemptions 
Law No. 5 provides various exemptions from its scope: (a) contracts 
implementing pre-existing law; (b) contracts concerning intellectual 
 45. Id. art. 25(2).  
 46. Id. art. 25(1).  
 47. Id. art. 26.  
 48. Id. art. 27(b).  
 49. Id. art. 28(1)-(2).  
 50. Id. art. 28(3).  
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property rights, trade secrets, and franchises; (c) contracts on technical 
standardization that do not restrict competition; (d) contracts that do not 
require resale or redistribution at a subsequently lower price; (e) research 
contracts designed to promote or improve the general welfare of 
Indonesian citizens; (f) government-ratified international contracts; (g) 
export contracts that do not affect domestic markets; (h) small businesses; 
and (i) cooperatives that exclusively serve members.51 
5. Abolishing Indonesia-Specific Monopolies 
In Indonesia, most monopolies are the result of government 
sponsorship. Laws and regulations passed by the government gave 
business actors their privileged positions. One notable example is Article 
33 of the Indonesian Constitution, which gave many state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) monopolies.52 Such anticompetitive behavior by the 
government has prevented other businesses from entering certain markets. 
Hence, “monopolies” in Indonesia are not the industrial monopolies that 
Law No. 5 was designed to prevent. 
Under Law No. 5, Indonesia-specific monopolies are illegal. Nowhere 
does it provide business actors or SOEs with special privileges, except as 
set forth in Article 51: 
Monopoly and/or the centralization of activities related to the 
production and/or marketing of goods and/or services which control 
the needs of people in general and production branches vital to the 
state shall be regulated under the law and shall be performed by the 
State-Owned Companies and/or entities or institutions established 
or appointed by the Government.53 
One reason why such privileges must now be given in the form of a 
law is to allow public participation through the representatives in 
Parliament. 
 51. Id. art. 50.  
 52. Article 33 of the Constitution of Indonesia consists of three paragraphs. Paragraph two states 
that “[s]ectors of production which are important for the country and affect the life of the people shall 
be controlled by the state.” Paragraph three states that “[t]he land, the waters and the natural riches 
contained therein shall be controlled by the State and exploited to the greatest benefit of the people.” 
UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] art. 33.  
 53. Law No. 5 of 1999 art. 51 (Indon.). 
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6. Enforcement Agencies 
a. The KPPU 
Similar to other countries with antimonopoly laws, Law No. 5 
established a commission to oversee its implementation, the KPPU. 
(1) Legal Framework 
Chapter IV of Law No. 5 established the KPPU. Presidential Decree 
No. 75/1999 provides additional provisions governing the KPPU, which 
reiterate and elaborate upon many of the provisions of Law No. 5.54 The 
KPPU did not begin to function until June 2000 when the President of 
Indonesia officially appointed its eleven members.55 
(2) Duties and Functions 
The duties of the KPPU are laid out in Article 35 as follows: (a) 
evaluating potentially monopolistic or anticompetitive contracts regulated 
under Articles 5 through 16; (b) evaluating potentially monopolistic or 
anticompetitive business practices regulated under Articles 17 through 24; 
(c) evaluating potential abuses of market dominant positions regulated 
under Articles 25 through 28; (d) taking appropriate action under its 
authenticity vested in Article 36; (e) advising on relevant government 
policy measures; (f) establishing related guidelines in accordance with 
Law No. 5; and (g) updating both the President and the House of 
Representatives on any progress or action taken.56 
The KPPU may only investigate cases that do not involve criminal 
elements. If monopoly practices or unfair competition possess any level of 
criminality then it is the responsibility of both the police to investigate and 
the public prosecutor to prosecute in a district court. However, to date, no 
court has decided a case with criminal elements. While there was a case 
 54. See Republic of Indonesia Presidential Decree No. 75 (1999) (concerning the KPPU). 
 55. See Republic of Indonesia Presidential Decree No. 162/M (2000) (concerning the Approval 
of the People’s Representative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia on the Nomination of 
Candidates to be Members of the KPPU). 
 56. Law No. 5 of 1999 art. 35 (Indon.). 
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where the police and the prosecutor invoked Law No. 5,57 the district court 
ultimately decided it did not apply. 
(3) Cases Decided 
At present, the KPPU has decided only two cases under Law No. 5. 
The first case involved Caltex, a multinational oil company operating in 
Indonesia. The case involved contract terms that Caltex imposed on its 
contractor, which the KPPU felt discriminated against local contractors.58 
The second case involved Indomaret, a supermarket chain store which 
many small businesses accused of forcing them out of the market.59 
 57. The case, involving Indonesia’s first cyber crime trial, was held at the Central Jakarta District 
Court. The defendant was accused of unfairly registering the domain name of a famous competitor in 
the cosmetics industry. In addition to charges under the Indonesian Criminal Code, the defendant was 
charged with violating Article 19 and Article 48, Paragraph 1 of Law No. 5. The presiding judge 
rejected the application of Law No. 5 as being irrelevant. See Case No. 1075/PID.B/2001/ 
PN.JKT.PST, 2 JURNAL KEADILAN [JUSTICE JOURNAL] 1, 76-84 (Jakarta Cent. Ct. 2002). The author 
agrees with the decision of the judge, as Law No. 5 deals primarily with entrepreneurs competing for a 
share of the market, rather than, as with the case in question, fraudulent use of a competitor’s name. 
 58. The KPPU found Caltex and three pipe processors, Citra, Purna, and Patraindo, guilty of bid 
rigging in violation of Article 22 of Law No. 5. The violation resulted from a tender offer by Caltex to 
receive supplies of pipe from the three manufacturers. The KPPU found that Citra, Purna, and 
Patraindo exchanged prices at a meeting the evening before the bids were opened. The KPPU also held 
Caltex responsible for failing to exercise adequate prudence in ensuring fair business competition 
because in setting up the tender process it should have expected from the beginning that collusion 
would occur. As a consequence of the violation, the KPPU declared the contract between Caltex and 
Citra, the lowest bidder, to be void and that the entire tender process had to be redone. Caltex accepted 
the KPPU's verdict and has not appealed to the district court. 
 59. Indomaret violated, or was alleged to have violated, the following provisions of Law No. 5: 
Article 1, Paragraph 4, for Indomaret’s dominant position controlled market shares based on financial 
capacity and access to supplies; and Article 1, Paragraph 8, for controlling the market for the benefits 
of the business entrepreneur involved in the conspiracy, which is prohibited by virtue of Article 22 
(conspiracy), Article 25 (dominant position), and Article 15 (prohibition against requiring supplies 
from certain business enactors). The KPPU determined that Indomaret did not observe the principle of 
balance in accordance with the principle of economic democracy in promoting healthy competition 
between the interests of business enactors and public interests, and it therefore ordered Indomaret to 
cease expansion within traditional markets, in which Indomaret competes directly with small-scale 
retailers, in the context of ensuring a competitive balance between large-, medium-, and small-scale 
enterprises.  
The KPPU recommended that the Indonesian government immediately complete and effect the 
implementation of regulations and policies including, but not limited to, policies on location and 
spatial arrangement, licensing, opening hours, and social environment. The KPPU also recommended 
that the government immediately guide and empower small- and medium-scale enterprises so as to 
increase their competitive power to help them compete successfully with larger enterprises. The KPPU 
declared that it will conduct further studies, monitoring, and investigation based on allegations of 
monopolistic practices and unfair business competition committed by business enactors vertically 
related to retailers, including the practices of price discrimination and closed agreements. 
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III. CHALLENGES AHEAD 
There are several challenges facing the successful implementation of 
Law No. 5. First, there are many different theories about why the 
government introduced Law No. 5 and what its true purposes are. Some 
believe that authorities should use Law No. 5 to redistribute assets from 
large conglomerates to the people of Indonesia. Others believe that the 
government designed the law to protect small businesses from aggressive 
competition from larger enterprises. Foreign enterprises may view Law 
No. 5 as a way to open up Indonesian markets. However, completely 
boiled down, Article 3 states that the basic objective of Law No. 5 is to 
safeguard the public interest and improve the efficiency of the national 
economy in order to better the welfare of the public.60 
Second, Indonesia’s antimonopoly law may become ineffective due to 
the resistance of many Indonesians who are suspicious of a hidden agenda 
on the part of the IMF. Many circles within Indonesia questioned why the 
IMF was involved directly in passing an antimonopoly law in Indonesia 
when the IMF’s role is simply to assist Indonesia with its macroeconomic 
issues and help Indonesia recover from its economic crisis. The skepticism 
in various circles in Indonesia stems from the belief that developed 
members of the IMF pushed for the enactment of the antimonopoly law in 
order to open up Indonesia’s markets, which ultimately would improve 
home businesses’ long term economic interests within Indonesia.61 A 
related theory suggests that IMF involvement in the passing of Law No. 5 
law stemmed from pressure from lobbying groups within Indonesia that 
individually lacked the power to change government policies. 
Theoretically, these groups pressured the IMF to change government 
 60. Article 3 states: 
The objectives of this law are:  
a. to maintain public interest and improve the efficiency of the national economy as one of 
the means to improve public welfare; 
b. to create a conducive business climate through healthy business competition, thus 
securing equal business opportunities for large, middle and small-scale entrepreneurs; 
c. to prevent monopolistic practices and/or unfair business competition by the 
entrepreneurs; and 
d. to create effectiveness and efficiency in business activities. 
Law No. 5 of 1999 art. 3 (Indon.). 
 61. Notable Indonesian economist Faisal Basri wrote: “[W]e need to be aware that the agents of 
globalization are not free of evil and destructive motives. They are not angels free of exploitative 
practices. The factors that have triggered this globalization are themselves the result of politically 
motivated decision-making.” See FAISAL BASRI, THE ROLE OF LAW AND COMPETITION POLICY IN 
FOSTERING ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN INDONESIA 4 (Inst. of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 2001). 
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policies, which ultimately would help Indonesian businesses obtain 
government-designated monopolies. 
Third, to be effective, the Indonesian people, the business community 
and, most importantly, the individuals enforcing the law (i.e. judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers) must completely understand Law No. 5. 
Currently, the socialization process that would ensure that the public 
understands Law No. 5 is in the introductory stages. Understanding Law 
No. 5 is incredibly important for both the people of Indonesia and its 
enforcement agencies. The people must understand that with Law No. 5 
the legal culture of Indonesia has changed from doing business by way of 
cooperation to doing business by way of competition. This is a relatively 
new concept for Indonesia because, like most Asian countries, the 
prevailing value is to promote cooperation rather than competition. 
Cooperation is an inherent aspect of agrarian societies like Indonesia. 
However, businesses must change any remaining emphasis on cooperation 
because the political leaders of Indonesia have determined that Indonesia 
now is an industrial country. As an industrial country, Indonesia therefore 
must institutionalize an economic legal infrastructure, including 
competition law. Since Law No. 5 is inconsistent with prevailing social 
values, society must shift its values to align itself with the law. The 
socialization process therefore is a critical issue that Indonesia must 
address before it can enforce Law No. 5 sanctions against violators. In 
addition to the importance of popular understanding, enforcement agencies 
that play a vital role in the effectiveness of Law No. 5 must thoroughly 
comprehend its provisions. Although members of the KPPU may possess a 
good understanding of the law, a case on appeal may be decided by a 
judge who lacks the same substantive understanding. As a result, the 
judges’ lack of knowledge may deny the parties the justice they seek.  
An understanding of general economics is important to understand and 
handle cases invoking Law No. 5. Indonesia differs from the United States 
because in Indonesia the faculty of law is more of an academic institution 
than a professional school. High school students immediately can join a 
faculty of law without first possessing a college degree. Hence, those who 
want to specialize in competition law must struggle with general 
economics studies. This situation is made worse by the fact that many of 
the students choose to study the law based on a dislike of economics and 
math. In addition, many lawyers and judges understand the law only as it 
appears on its face and do not delve into the relevant underlying substance 
or meaning. 
Fourth, there must be effective law enforcement, which will depend 
greatly on the KPPU. However, currently there are various problems 
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surrounding the KPPU, including a lack of: (1) funding; (2) public 
recognition; (3) an effective infrastructure; and (4) staffing. Unless the 
KPPU is given the support necessary to function properly, it will become 
an ineffective agent of enforcement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Indonesia now has both an antimonopoly law and an independent 
enforcement agency. However, this does not guarantee the instant 
eradication of monopolistic practices and unfair business competition. The 
effectiveness of Law No. 5 will depend greatly on how seriously the law is 
enforced and how readily society accepts its scope and effects. While Law 
No. 5 is by no means perfect, it nevertheless has the present potential to 
serve very useful purposes. However, given greater experience and time, it 
almost certainly will be improved. 
Today Law No. 5 is merely a small dot in the corner of a large blank 
canvas. However, with wise leadership from the KPPU, support from both 
the Indonesian government and Parliament, and the will of the people and 
businesses to see the law succeed, the future embodiment of competition 
law and policy in Indonesia will emerge from its present foundation. 
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